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ABSTRACT: James Van Cleve raises some objections to my attempt to solve the 
bootstrapping problem for what I call “basic justification theories.” I argue that given 1 
the inference rules endorsed by basic justification theorists, we are a priori 
(propositionally) justified in believing that perception is reliable. This blocks the 
bootstrapping result. 
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James Van Cleve raises some objections to my attempt to solve the 
bootstrapping problem for what I call “basic justification theories.”1 I argue that 
given 1 the inference rules endorsed by basic justification theorists, we are a priori 
(propositionally) justified in believing that perception is reliable. This blocks the 
bootstrapping result.2 I appeal to two defensible claims about perceptual 
justification: 
(1) Perceptual justification proceeds in terms of propositional, i.e.,       
propositionally representable, reasons concerning how things appear. 
(2) A proposition P can be one’s reason, even if one does not believe P. 
Given (1), we can say that, e.g., the table looks red is a (defeasible) reason 
for me to believe the table is red. Given (2), I can possess that reason even if I do 
not believe the table looks red. Rather I can possess that reason if I am in a certain 
phenomenal state, the state of the table’s looking red to me. On this view, there is 
a defeasible inference rule 
R: a looks red 
a is red 
One may think that inference is a relation that obtains only between 
beliefs. As we do not typically have beliefs about how things appear, it may be 
misleading to characterize R as an inference rule. If so, we can think of R as a rule 
                                                                
1 James Van Cleve, “Does Suppositional Reasoning Solve the Bootstrapping Problem?” Logos & 
Episteme VI, 3 (2015): 351-363. All Van Cleve page references are to this. 
2 See Stewart Cohen, “Bootstrapping, Defeasible Reasoning, and A Priori Justification,” 
Philosophical Perspectives 24, 1 (2010):141-159. 
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that permits transitions from perceptual states to beliefs about the world, e.g., 
from something’s looking red, to believing it is red. So according to R, when the 
table looks red to me, I can on that basis justifiably believe the table is red. Given 
the correctness of rule R, I argue we can engage in a kind of reasoning akin to 
conditional proof in logic. We can suppose 
a looks red 
Applying R, we can derive 
a is red 
Then by discharging the assumption, we can conclude 
If a is red, then a looks red. 
Since R is defeasible, this reasoning does not count as a proof of the 
conditional. instead it generates a defeasible reason for believing the conditional. 
Perceptual Reasons and Experience 
Van Cleve’s objection to my argument hinges on what he says are “two routes to 
becoming justified in believing something:” 
To explain why I think Cohen’s strategy does not work, I begin by distinguishing 
two routes to being justified in believing something. One route – the only one 
recognized by Cohen – proceeds in terms of reasons; the other proceeds in terms 
of experiences. In the reasons route, one ‘has’ a reason, which supports some 
further proposition… A typical case would involve believing some premises and 
inferring a conclusion from them; the premises would be one’s reasons (or their 
conjunction one’s reason). Cohen is willing to speak also of reasons in cases in 
which one does not believe the premises or draw any explicit inference. (354-
355) 
On the view of perceptual justification I outlined, what Van Cleve 
characterizes as two different ways of becoming justified are actually the same. On 
my view, a looks red is a defeasible reason to believe a is red. I possess this reason 
just in case I have a certain kind of experience, viz. an experience whereby a does 
look red to me. So there is no dichotomy between the experiential route to 
justification and the reasons route. One has a perceptual reason in virtue of having 
a perceptual experience.3 
Does Van Cleve have an objection to my account of perceptual justification? 
Here is Van Cleve: 
                                                                
3 I argue for this in Cohen, “Bootstrapping, Defeasible Reasoning,” 150-151. 
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I think this much is clear, however: having a reason P that supports Q does not 
make you justified in believing Q (or make Q propositionally justified for you) 
unless P is justified for you. (355) 
I do not understand this passage. You can possess P as a reason by being 
justified in believing P. But Van Cleve seems to be raising the possibility that you 
could possess P even though P is not justified for you. On my view, this is indeed 
possible, for there are two ways you can possess a reason P. You can possess P by 
justifiably believing P, or where P is the proposition that you are in a certain 
experiential state, you can possess P by being in that state. In the latter case, it 
would be possible to have P as a reason without P being justified for you. But Van 
Cleve contrasts having a reason with being in an experiential state. So I do not see 
how it is possible on Van Cleve’s view to have P as a reason without P being 
justified for you. The important issue however concerns what it take to possess a 
reason. For if one possesses the reason P, then one is thereby (defeasibly) justified 
in believing Q. Perhaps Van Cleve just means to say that the only way to possess a 
reason is to be justified in believing it. But that is simply a denial of my view, not 
an argument against it. 
Van Cleve also objects to the possibility of doing suppositional reasoning on 
an experiential view or perceptual justification: 
But how would suppositional reasoning work in the framework of an 
experiential theory, in which what justifies me in believing that something is red 
is the experiential state of something’s looking red to me?… First, I would make 
the supposition that x looks red to me; let’s say I write it down. Next, I would 
conclude that x is red and write that down, too. But what authorizes me in doing 
that? What it takes to make me justified in believing that something is red is 
being in the state of having it look red to me, and I am not in that state. (356) 
I agree that suppositional reasoning does not make sense if we do not view 
perceptual justification as deriving from perceptual reasons. We can do the 
suppositional reasoning only if a looks red is a reason to believe a is red. But just as 
in conditional proof, we do not have to prove P in order to suppose P in 
conditional proof, so we do not have to be justified in believing P in order to 
suppose P in suppositional reasoning. The whole point is to assume P, and then 
infer Q by the relevant rules. This allows us either to either prove (via conditional 
proof), or acquire a defeasible reason (via suppositional reasoning) for P —> Q. 
Of course one may object to using conditional proof as a model for 
suppositional reasoning.4 I argue that one may follow essentially the same 
procedure in doing suppositional proof that one follows when doing conditional 
                                                                
4 Brian Weatherson, “Induction and Supposition,” The Reasoner 6 (2012): 78-80. 
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proof. But Van Cleve’s objection is not that one cannot do suppositional reasoning 
with perceptual reasons. Rather it is that there are no perceptual reasons to form 
the basis for suppositional reasoning But I do not see that he has an argument for 
this. 
Incoherence 
I argue that basic justification theories are incoherent in denying 
(1) We cannot have justified perceptual beliefs without having a prior justified 
belief that perception is reliable. 
Basic justification theorists endorse rule R that allows one to believe a is red 
on the basis of a looks red. But if my argument is correct, anyone who is 
competent in the use of the rule is propositionally justified via suppositional 
reasoning in believing that perception is reliable. This means one cannot have 
justified perceptual beliefs without having a prior justified belief that perception is 
reliable. 
Van Cleve suggests that I myself am guilty of incoherence. I endorse rule R 
while also accepting (1). R allows me to be justified in believe a is red on the basis 
of a looks red, while (1) says that one cannot have a justified perceptual belief 
without a prior justified belief that perception is reliable. Van Cleve questions 
how a looks red can be sufficient for me to be justified in believing a is red, if a 
necessary condition of my being so justified is that I have prior justification for 
believing that perception is reliable. 
But there is no incoherence here. The table’s looking red is sufficient for me 
to believe that it is red because rule R licenses my believing the table is red solely 
on the basis of its looking red. But that is consistent with (1) in that my being 
justified in this way entails that I have justification for believing that perception is 
reliable. For if I am justified via the rule, then I am competent in the use of R. And 
if I am competent to use R, then I am propositionally justified via suppositional 
reasoning in believing perception is reliable. That perception is reliable is not part 
of my justificatory basis for believing the table is red, rather it is a necessary 
consequence of it. 
Epistemic Supervenience 
Van Cleve argues that my view violates a plausible epistemic supervenience 
principle: 
if two beliefs (occurring in the same or different worlds) are just alike in all 
nonepistemic respects – in their content, their environmental causes, the 
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experiences that accompany them, their relations to the other beliefs of the 
subject, and so on – then they are also alike in epistemic status; both are justified 
to the same degree. Equivalently, whenever a belief is justified or has a certain 
epistemic status, it also has some constellation of nonepistemic properties such 
that (necessarily) any belief with those properties is justified. For short, for any 
epistemic property any belief possesses, there is a nonepistemic sufficient 
condition for it. (361) 
I agree that we should accept this principle, but disagree that my view 
violates it. On my view, there is a non-epistemic condition sufficient for 
perceptual justification. For example, having the reason a looks red is sufficient for 
justifiably believing a is red. Van Cleve worries that my view violates 
supervenience because I say that perceptual justification requires having 
justification for believing perception is reliable, an epistemic condition. But given 
that the epistemic condition is entailed by the non-epistemic condition, there is 
no violation of supervenience. There is no barrier to saying that if two beliefs are 
alike in all non-epistemic respects then they are also alike in epistemic status.
